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INTRODUCTION

Although there is a long tradition of using arbitration to resolve
commercial disputes in Latin America, in recent years, most Latin
American jurisdictions have revised or amended their national arbitration
laws to make their jurisdictions even friendlier toward and supportive of
arbitration as a method of alternative dispute settlement. This trend
suggests that Latin American jurisdictions are even more committed to
using arbitration to resolve commercial disputes, especially given the
* Partner, King & Spalding. This Article draws upon remarks made by Henry (Harry)
G. Burnett at the Third Symposium on International Commercial Arbitration, which
took place at American University Washington College of Law in Washington, D.C. on
November 17, 2015. The specific panel on which he participated focused on
developments in international commercial arbitration in Latin America. Mr. Burnett
made four main observations, which are discussed below. Mr. Burnett would like to
thank his colleagues Viren Mascarenhas and Alberto Madero for the invaluable
assistance in putting together both the presentation and this Article.
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backlog of cases being litigated in the national courts.
Second, it is insufficient to look at the arbitration laws as they are written
in the books to assess whether a jurisdiction is supportive of arbitration.
When advising a client about seating an arbitration, in a particular Latin
American jurisdiction, one must assess the attitude of the judiciary to
determine the level of respect given to the arbitral process and the degree of
judicial involvement (or interference) with the arbitral process. In this
regard, a review of recent case law reveals that there is generally healthy
support on the part of national judiciaries toward arbitration.
Third, there is a proliferation and flourishing of arbitration institutions
throughout Latin America. This may be regarded as a sign that the
business and legal communities believe that arbitration will be used more
frequently to resolve commercial disputes. However, it is insufficient to
simply look at the number of arbitral institutions in a particular jurisdiction
Rather, one must be more
to assess its local arbitration culture.
sophisticated in assessing the relevance and use of the various institutions,
which can be accomplished by examining their institutional rules and
practices; reviewing their caseloads, including the types of disputes they
hear and examining the identities of the parties in those cases to determine
whether the institution deals primarily with domestic, regional, or
international disputes.
Fourth, the use of mediation is in its relative infancy compared to the use
of arbitration as a mechanism for alternative dispute resolution. However,
it is likely that, over the course of the twenty-first century, mediation will
become a more popular form of alternative dispute resolution in Latin
America. In part, this move toward mediation will be driven by costs, as
international arbitration and litigation practices are becoming increasingly
expensive. Accordingly, it is likely that parties will turn to mediation in an
attempt to reach a compromise before continuing down the path of binding
dispute settlement (whether before a court or an arbitral tribunal). In some
cases, legislation in various jurisdictions (for example, Brazil) will require
the parties to engage in good faith mediation in complex commercial cases
before proceeding to litigation. Thus, it is likely that we will see more
recourse to mediation in Latin America than has previously been witnessed.
II. ARBITRATION LAWS 1N LATIN AMERICA: OVERHAUL AND FINETUNING OF PRIOR LEGISLATION

Arbitration is by no means a new method of dispute resolution in Latin
America. Indeed, the use of arbitration to resolve a wide range of disputes,
both inter-state and private commercial disputes, dates back centuries in
some Latin American jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it was not until the
twentieth century that arbitration became codified in the national
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legislations of most Latin American jurisdictions as a viable mechanism to
resolve commercial disputes. In particular, the market-oriented reforms
witnessed in a number of Latin American jurisdictions in the last quarter of
the twentieth century brought an increased focus on improving the use and
availability of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes. During this
period of reform, many Latin American jurisdictions signed and ratified the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention") and promulgated national
arbitration laws that were based in large part on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985. Thus, the stage was
set for arbitration to be used as an effective and popular form of dispute
settlement, especially given the judicial backlog prevalent in many Latin
American jurisdictions.
Latin American jurisdictions have spent the early years of the twentyfirst century fine-tuning and improving their national arbitration laws. In
particular, many jurisdictions have amended or revised their national laws
in the last ten years to make sure that they are up-to-date and represent
international best practices. Examples of jurisdictions that have made such
changes to their national arbitration laws include Argentina (2015), Brazil
(2015), Panama (2013), Colombia (2012), Costa Rica (2011), Ecuador
(2009), Peru (2008), and Chile (2004).
This is by no means a
comprehensive list of Latin American jurisdictions that have revised or
amended their national arbitration laws during the past ten years. However,
this illustrative list demonstrates that improving or revising arbitration laws
has been a recent focus of many jurisdictions in Latin America that are
leading the way in the use of arbitration to resolve commercial disputes.
Of course, it is important to look at the specific changes that have been
made in each country's legislation. When advising a client on whether to
seat an arbitration in a particular jurisdiction, or whether the laws of a
country are arbitration-friendly, it would be improper and insufficient to
generalize Latin America as an arbitration-friendly climate. Rather, it is
important to get into the specifics and ask the right questions. For example,
it would be prudent to inquire as to whether the recent revisions to the laws
signify an overhaul or merely a fine-tuning of prior legislation. For
example, in Brazil, Law 13.129/2015, enacted in July 2015, amended some
of the provisions of the Brazil Arbitration Act that had been passed in
1996. This was the first change to the country's arbitration regime in
nineteen years. The arbitral community has generally regarded Brazil's
1996 arbitration law as a relative success, but the Brazilian legislature
wished to make the arbitration law even more efficient. Accordingly, some
fine-tuning was in order. The revised law contains an express provision
authorizing arbitrators to issue partial arbitral awards, which courts may
enforce. It had already become common practice to enforce a partial award
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in Brazilian courts - the amendment simply codified this judicial practice
to make it clear that courts may enforce partial awards, even if they are not
final awards, and to prevent a party from raising an objection to such
enforcement. The amendment also contains an express provision granting
arbitrators the power to issue provisional remedies, a prevailing practice
confirmed by the legislative amendment. Thus, it appears that the 2015
amendment to the 1996 Brazilian legislation falls more into the category of
fine-tuning, rather than an overhaul, of the arbitration regime.
Similarly, the 2011 modifications to the Mexican Commercial Code
provisions addressing arbitration also fall into the category of fine-tuning.
Four main amendments were made in 2011. First, Articles 1464 and 1465
confirmed the arbitral tribunal's authority to decide its own jurisdiction (the
principle of kompetenz-kompetenz). Second, Article 1466 introduced a
special summary procedure for courts to decide enforcement and set-aside
applications. Third, Article 1478 confirmed existing practice that Mexican
courts could issue interim measures in aid of arbitration. Fourth, Article
1479 provided that interim awards issued by arbitrators were judicially
enforceable, and could be enforced using a fast-track procedure. As was
the case with Brazil, the main focus of the amendments was to codify
existing practice and make a strong domestic arbitral regime even stronger.
In other cases, there has been a more significant overhaul of prior
national arbitration laws. For example, in July 2012, Colombia enacted a
revised version of its arbitration statute in the adoption of Law 1563/2012.
Law 1563 adopted a dualistic approach by providing separate legal regimes
for domestic and international arbitration. The international arbitration
chapter is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, including the amendments approved in 2006.
However, minor changes were made in order to adapt the UNCITRAL
Model Law to the Colombian legal tradition and to introduce certain
innovations adopted in other jurisdictions, such as France and Belgium.
The detailed provisions of the new arbitration statute differ significantly
from the preceding legal framework, Law 315/1996, which contained just
five articles. When applying Law 315/1996, Colombian courts relied on
local procedural rules to fill in the gaps and determined the degree to which
they were willing to intervene in international arbitration proceedings. The
new arbitration statute sought to end the local courts' discretion to
intervene in the arbitral process. Article 67 of Law 1563 expressly limits
the intervention of local courts in international arbitration proceedings to
those few instances where the arbitration statute expressly authorizes it, in
compliance with the procedures codified in the statute (based on Article 5
of the UNCITRAL Model Law).
All of these new rules are modeled, to a great extent, on the UNCITRAL

2016

JURISDICTIONS ATTRACTING INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

391

Model Law: (i) appointment of arbitrators; (ii) grounds for challenge of an
arbitrator; (iii) substitution of an arbitrator; (iv) enforcement of an
arbitration agreement; (v) interim measures by a court before or during
arbitral proceedings; (vi) authority of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own
jurisdiction; and (vii) other procedural rules.
The 2012 statute includes rules on a series of matters that were absent in
the preceding arbitration statute.
A major innovation of the 2012
arbitration statute is that it no longer allows courts to have recourse to local
procedural rules as grounds upon which to deny recognition and
enforcement of an award. The 2012 arbitration statute expressly provides
that the New York Convention is the only legal instrument that governs
enforcement and recognition proceedings of foreign arbitral awards. This
was not always the case under the prior arbitral regime. In 1999, the
Colombian Supreme Court relied previously on the grounds listed in Art.
694 of Colombia's Civil Procedural Code to deny the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, in addition to those grounds
provided for in Article V of the New York Convention.' Subsequently, in
December 2011, the Colombian Supreme Court adopted a different
position in Drummond Ltda. v. Ferroviasen Liquidaci6n and Ferrocarriles
Nacionales de Colombia. The court concluded for the first time that the
exequatur of foreign arbitral awards should be analyzed only under the
regime established in Article V of the New York Convention. 2 This was a
change from the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence, and this position was
codified in the 2012 arbitration statute.
In sum, Colombia's revisions to the existing arbitration law constitutes
more of an "overhaul" than a "fine-tuning."
While overhauling a
previously weaker body of law demonstrates commitment on the part of the
jurisdiction towards arbitration, it also means that the new laws are
relatively untested. It remains to be seen how the judiciary will respond to
the overhauled laws. Only time will tell.
III. ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TOWARDS ARBITRATION

While legislative innovation is welcome to make arbitration more robust
and effective, it is insufficient to simply scrutinize the law on the books.
One must also assess how the courts apply those laws. A review of recent
decisions from courts of various Latin American jurisdictions regarding the

1. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2011, M: W.
Vargas, Expediente 11001-0203-000-201140581-00 (Colom.); Corte Suprema de
Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 1 marzo 1999, M.P: J. Ramirez Gomez, Expediente
E-7474 (Colom.).
2. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 19 diciembre 2011, M.P:
F. Gutierrez, Expediente 1100140203000-2008-01760-00 (Colom.).
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arbitral process and recognition and enforcement of awards reveals a proarbitration trend- It is beyond the scope of this article to comprehensively
review the recent decisions from all Latin American jurisdictions.
However, the informal survey that has been conducted demonstrates
sufficient evidence that the leading jurisdictions are in favor of the use of
commercial arbitration as an alternative to courtroom litigation.
For example, recent decisions from the Chilean Courts interpreting
Chilean Law No. 19971 (2004) show restraint on the part of the courts with
interfering in the arbitral process. In these cases, the Chilean courts
declined to annul an award when doing so would have improperly required
the courts to scrutinize the merits of the award rendered by the arbitral
tribunals. In the case Ann Arbor Food S.A. v. Domino 's Pizza,3 Ann Arbor
Food S.A., the award debtor, sought to set aside an arbitral award rendered
by an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitral tribunal on the
basis that the award violated the public policy of Chile. The underlying
dispute in the arbitral proceedings concerned the alleged breach by Ann
Arbor Foods S.A. of a franchise agreement that granted it the exclusive
right to exploit the Domino's Pizza brand in specified areas of Chile. The
ICC arbitral tribunal issued an award in favor of Domino's Pizza. Ann
Arbor Foods S.A. initiated set-aside proceedings before the Court of
Appeals of Santiago. It claimed that the arbitral tribunal made substantive
errors by enforcing allegedly punitive clauses of the franchise agreement
that violated Chilean public order, including provisions of the Chilean Civil
Code and Constitution.
The Court of Appeals rejected all of the claims. Of particular relevance,
the court held that annulment is the only action allowed under Chile's
Arbitration Statute - Law 19971 of 2004 - to set aside an award.
Moreover, it cautioned that annulment may be initiated only in the limited
circumstances set forth in Article 34 of Law 19971, which reproduces the
grounds for denying recognition and enforcement of a foreign award
specified in the New York Convention. The court also explained that not
every alleged procedural deficiency in the arbitral process gives rise to a
valid claim to annul an award. Against this background, the Court
determined that Ann Arbor Foods' arguments did not fall under any of
grounds to annul an award provided for in Law 19971. Rather, the
arguments were styled more in the manner of seeking appellate review of a
lower court's decision, which the court declined to do.
The Court of Appeals of Santiago reaffirmed its non-interventionist
approach regarding international arbitration in the case Productos
Naturales de la Sabana S.A. v. Corte Internacional de Arbitraje de la
3. Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (C. Apel.) [Courts of Appeals], 9 octubre
2012, "Ann Arbor Food S.A. c. Domino's Pizza," Rol de la causa: 1420-2010 (Chile).
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Ccimara de Comercio.4 An ICC arbitral tribunal ordered Productos
Naturales de la Sabana S.A. ("Productos Naturales") to pay 50% of the
claimant's administrative fees and legal expenses. Thereafter, Productos
Naturales sought partial annulment of the award on the basis of section
3.4(a)(iii) of Law 19971, alleging that the decision on allocation of costs
dealt with a dispute not contemplated within the terms of the submission to
arbitration. Specifically, the award debtor argued that the arbitral tribunal's
decision to allocate costs breached the arbitration agreement, which
expressly provided that the parties would bear their own costs and legal
expenses. Productos Naturales also argued that the arbitral tribunal erred
when it reached the conclusion that the parties' legal representatives
modified the arbitration agreement when they requested the arbitral tribunal
to order the other party to bear its costs.
The court rejected the argument advanced by the award debtor. The
court concluded that the claimant and respondent both authorized the
arbitral tribunal to rule on costs, having requested the arbitral tribunal in
their written submission to order the opposing party to pay its costs. In
particular, the court relied heavily on the fact that the Terms of Reference
for the arbitration, agreed upon both parties, expressly included cost and
expenses allocation as one of the issue that the arbitral tribunal would
decide in the arbitration.
In addition, the court observed that, under Articles 4 and 16 of Law
19971, a party forfeits its right to challenge the arbitral tribunal's authority
if it fails to raise its objections during the arbitral proceeding at the
appropriate time. Given that Productos Naturales had not raised this
objection during the arbitral proceeding the court concluded that the party
had waived its right to challenge the arbitral award on the grounds that the
tribunal acted in contravention of the arbitral agreement regarding
allocation of costs and expenses.
The court also rejected the requesting party's claim that the formal
amendment procedure provided for in the contract prevented its legal
representatives from modifying the arbitration agreement, which expressly
provided that each party would bear its own costs. The court determined
that the formal amendment procedure was limited to modifications
pertaining to "the material object of the contract," relying on the language
of Article 17 of the contract. The court reasoned that Articles 7 and 16 of
Law 19971 espouse the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, pursuant to
which the arbitration agreement may be considered to be independent from
the contract in which it is contained. To this end, the court concluded that
the arbitration agreement was not part of the material object of the contract,
4. Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (C. Apel.) [Courts of Appeals], 29 abril
2012, "Productos Naturales de la Sabana S.A.," Rol de la causa: 6975-2012 (Chile).
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and thus the formal amendment procedure did not preclude the parties from
modifying the arbitration agreement by requesting the arbitral tribunal to
rule on court fees and expenses. The court concluded that the arbitral
tribunal was competent to decide on the court costs and expenses since it
was an issue expressly requested by the parties in their submissions. Thus,
the court exhibited a practical approach in declining to review the merits of
the arbitral tribunal's decision on costs and upholding the award.
Shortly after Productos Naturales de la Sabana S.A. v. Corte
Internacionalde Arbitraje de la C6mara de Comercio, the Supreme Court
of Chile granted the application for recognition and enforcement of an
award in the case LaboratoriosKin S.A. v. LaboratoriosPasteur S.A. 5 The
arbitral tribunal, seated in Spain, had concluded in its award that
Laboratorios Pasteur S.A. had breached the exclusive distribution
agreement it had entered into with Laboratorios Kin S.A. In this case,
Laboratorios Kin S.A. initiated exequatur proceedings seeking the
enforcement of an arbitral award issued pursuant to the Rules of the
Chamber of Commerce of Barcelona, and the enforcement of a judicial
decision of a Spanish Court that rejected the application for annulment of
the award in Spain.
In the recognition and enforcement proceedings, Laboratorios Pasteur
S.A. argued that the Court should refuse the enforcement of the arbitral
award and judicial decision, which denied its annulment application, based
on several of the grounds to deny enforcement set forth in Article 36 of
Law 19971. Among its various objections, it argued that the arbitral
tribunal had not been established in accordance with the arbitration
agreement; the award dealt with a dispute not covered by the arbitration
agreement; and the arbitration agreement was not valid.
The Supreme Court rejected Laboratorios Pasteur's allegations on the
basis that it had no authority to review neither the merits of the arbitral
award nor the merits of the Spanish judicial decision that denied the request
for annulment. The Supreme Court determined that these objections were
timely raised and dismissed in both the arbitral proceeding and the
annulment proceeding before the Spanish court. In particular, the Supreme
Court pointed to the fact that the arbitral tribunal and the Spanish court had
already found that the arbitration agreement was valid, the arbitral tribunal
had properly been established, and that the dispute was covered by the
Therefore, the Supreme Court refrained from
arbitration agreement.
reviewing these issues again.
In addition, the Supreme Court elaborated on the limits of Chilean courts
5. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 13 octubre 2014,
"Laboratorios Kin S.A. c. Laboratorios Pasteur S.A.," Rol de la causa: 1270-2014
(Chile).
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to review the merits of arbitral awards. The Supreme Court cautioned that
the ultimate objective of exequatur proceedings of an arbitral award "is to
verify the fulfillment of certain minimum requirements and is not intended
in any way to analyze the intrinsic justice or injustice of the decision, thus
it does not constitute in any way an instance to review what [the decision]
resolves." The court also rejected Laboratorios Pasteur S.A.'s allegation
that the decision of the Spanish court denying annulment could not be
enforced pursuant to Law 19971, given that it was not a decision of an
arbitral tribunal (but rather a judgment of a foreign court relating to an
arbitral award). The court concluded that an arbitral award and a judicial
decision that denies an annulment application against that award together
constitute an "indivisible unit," and thus decided to enforce both decisions
under the recognition and enforcement procedure set forth in Law 19971.
In sum, these decisions show a restraint on the part of the Chilean courts to
avoid unduly interfering with the arbitral process.
There is also some positive case law from Peru where the Peruvian
courts have rejected a request by the losing party seeking to vacate an
award where such vacatur application essentially required them to review
the merits of an arbitral award. In a decision dated April 17, 2015, the
Superior Court of Lima refused to set aside an arbitral award in the case
Pure Biofuels v. Blue Oil.6 Pure Biofuels and Blue Oil had entered into a
contract for the storage of hydrocarbons, which provided for arbitration
before Lima's Chamber of Commerce. Pure Biofuels initiated arbitration
proceedings, but the arbitration tribunal dismissed all of its claims and
ordered it to pay the damages sought by Blue Oil.
Pure Biofuels sought annulment of the award on the grounds that (i) the
arbitrators did not deliberate in the final decision because one of them (the
dissenting arbitrator) allegedly had been excluded from deliberations; (ii)
two arbitrators did not fulfill their duty of disclosure, undermining the
impartiality of the tribunal; and (iii) the decision on damages was not
reasoned. The Court rejected all of these claims.
Regarding the first ground, the Court pointed to the fact that neither the
Peruvian arbitration statute nor the Rules of Arbitration of Lima's Chamber
of Commerce contained a detailed procedure for how an arbitral tribunal
should conduct deliberations. Notwithstanding the fact that the dissenting
arbitrator chose not to provide comments, the Court found that the parties
and arbitrators acknowledged that all of the arbitrators received two drafts
of the award and had ample opportunity to comment on them. Indeed, the
allegedly excluded arbitrator had indicated that he disagreed with the draft
award and, instead of making revisions to the draft award, would issue a

6.

Superior Court of Justice of Lima, Pure Biofuels v. Blue Oil, April 17, 2015.
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dissenting opinion. On this basis, the court concluded that the dissenting
arbitrator had sufficiently participated in the deliberations for due process
purposes.
Next, on the duty to disclose, the court determined that the requesting
party failed to demonstrate how the undisclosed fact, that two arbitrators
had served together in previous arbitral tribunals, was sufficient to
conclude that the two arbitrators were biased or partial in favor of one of
the parties. Finally, regarding the lack of proper reasoning of the award,
the court was careful not to second-guess the methodology adopted by the
arbitral tribunal to determine the amount of damages. After a careful
examination of the arbitral tribunal's reasoning, the court concluded that
the procedure to calculate the damages was reasonable and equitable.
Throughout its decision, the court was cautious not to overstep its
boundaries given its limited role in enforcing an award.
Thus, we have seen examples of courts from various jurisdictions, such
as Chile and Peru, exercising restraint and adopting a practical approach
that results in the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
Admittedly, we cannot conclude from these examples that Latin American
courts inevitably, or as a matter of course, will remain within their limited
remits when reviewing applications to annul or deny recognition and
enforcement of an award. However, these recent examples point towards a
pro-arbitration trend whereby courts are cautious to overstep their roles,
especially given how those roles have been more narrowly demarcated in
recent amendments to national arbitration laws.
IV. INSTITUTIONS AND ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

In addition to the law on the books and the attitude of the courts, another
indicator of the health of an arbitral regime is the vitality of national
arbitral institutions. Generally, there has been an increase in the number of
arbitral institutions worldwide, with some of these institutions, at least
regionally, competing with each other. For example, there is a healthy
rivalry between the Singapore International Arbitration Center and the
Hong Kong International Arbitration Center to become the institution of
choice for administering international arbitrations seated in Asia.
Likewise, there is a healthy rivalry between the London Court of
International Arbitration, headquartered in London, and the ICC Court of
Arbitration, headquartered in Paris, with regard to arbitrations seated in
Europe. The question that arises then is which of the institutions based in
the various Latin American jurisdictions will rise to prominence with
regard to international arbitrations seated in Latin America. The answer to
this question will depend, in part, on the aims of each individual institution.
Does it seek to cater to disputes of a particular nature? For example, the
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World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center
focuses on disputes concerning intellectual property. Does it cater to
domestic arbitrations? Does it seek regional prominence? International
prominence?
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore and discuss all of the
arbitral institutions found in all of Latin America. But the informal survey
undertaken of several jurisdictions suggests that there is healthy
competition among arbitral institutions in each jurisdiction. For example,
here are some of the national institutions found in Peru alone: American
Chamber of Commerce of Peru; Center of Arbitration of the Lima Chamber
of Commerce; Center of Arbitration and Mediation of the Arequipa
Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Center of Mediation and National
and International Arbitration of the Piura Chamber of Commerce;
andCenter of Mediation and Arbitration of the Pontificia Universidad
Cat6lica del Peru.
Now this is just a list of some of the leading arbitration institutions in
Peru. But to really find out about the vibrancy of the system, one needs to
dig deeper into the details of each institution. How many arbitrations does
the institution handle per year? Do those arbitrations primarily involve
domestic, regional or international parties? When did the institution last
revise its arbitration rules? Do the rules contain provisions found in more
recent versions being promulgated by the leading institutions, such as the
ability to obtain provisional measures from an emergency arbitrator prior to
the constitution of an arbitral tribunal? What are the institution's fees to
administer an arbitration? For example, with regard to the Mexican
Arbitration Center, statistics for the year 2012 (the most recent year for
which this information is publicly available) indicate that ninety-seven
percent of the arbitrations it administers are conducted in Spanish, eightyone percent of the arbitrations are seated in Mexico City, and ninety-eight
of the arbitrators appointed in its arbitrations have Mexican nationality.
Clearly, there is a strong national flavor to the arbitrations that the Mexican
Arbitration Center administers. Thus, local disputes are its specialty.
More recent figures are available with regard to the number of
arbitrations administered by the leading institutions in Brazil. The statistics
for the year 2014 are as follows: Center for Arbitrations and Mediation of
the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada:
ninety-five arbitrations;
Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the American Chamber of
Commerce for Brazil:
eighty-two arbitrations; Business Arbitration
Chamber - Brazil: thirty-two arbitrations; Chamber of Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration of Sdo Paolo: forty-one arbitrations. These
statistics are helpful in that they allow comparison of the relative caseload
of each institution, which can guide a user seeking to choose one of the
institutions to administer the arbitration.
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The growing number of arbitral institutions in Latin American
jurisdictions indicates that the trend is in favor of using arbitration to
resolve commercial disputes. After all, these institutions would not have
been created unless consumers anticipated that a market would exist for
their use. That being said, one cannot conclude that the presence of a
relatively large number of arbitral institutions in a specific jurisdiction
means that jurisdiction is arbitration-friendly, or that it is a destination of
choice for international parties to seat their arbitrations. Rather, one must
dig beneath the surface to assess the true vitality of each individual
institution. Thus, when advising a client about where to seat an arbitration,
one must look to the arbitration laws as well as the recent judicial decisions
to determine whether the jurisdiction is pro-arbitration. Thereafter, when
choosing a particular institution's rules, one must canvass the available
options, which requires reviewing the latest versions of each institution's
rules; the case law to assess whether there is anything unfavorable in the
judicial record about the institution's rules and procedures; the case load of
each institution; and the composition of the parties to the arbitration and the
kinds of disputes being resolved (in particular, to get a flavor for whether
the institution is chosen for primarily national, regional or international
disputes). Certainly, a lot of options exist now in Latin America to choose
among arbitration institutions. However, some more vetting needs to be
done as these institutions, for the most part, are relatively young and are
still finding their footing in the arbitration landscape.
V. MEDIATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Arbitration is better developed as a means of alternative dispute
resolution in Latin America than mediation, which relatively is in its
infancy. The current trend is in favor of increased use of mediation to
resolve disputes, especially given the backlog of cases in the judiciaries of
several Latin American jurisdictions, and the high costs of binding dispute
settlement (both litigation and arbitration). Recently, the International
Development Bank helped create or strengthen around 230 mediation
centers throughout Latin America, and has trained more than 2,000
mediators since 2004. The national chambers of commerce in the various
jurisdictions tend to be one of the strongest supporters of mediation
throughout Latin America.
Here are some observations that can be made about the use of mediation
to resolve commercial disputes in Latin America. First, some jurisdictions
have adopted legislation whereby mediation or conciliation must be
exhausted before a party is able to continue with a lawsuit. Such
legislation usually provides that the settlement agreement that results from
mediation or conciliation should have the same effect as an arbitral award
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for purposes of enforcement and res judicata. Such countries include
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. In the United States, it is not
uncommon for a judge to require the parties to mediate a dispute before
trial in the hopes that the parties will settle the litigation. It is possible that
in addition to mediation that is statutorily mandated, court-ordered
mediation may become more popular in Latin America as well.
Second, an increasing number of Latin American jurisdictions are
focusing on mediation as a viable means of dispute settlement. For
example, Brazil enacted the Mediation Statute, Law 13,140, which will
enter into force in January 2016. The Mediation Statute promulgates rules
for mediation between individuals as well as disputes with public, Stateowned entities. The Mediation Statute also outlines the basic requirements
of due process in a mediation: (a) impartiality of the mediator; (b) equality
between the parties; (c) verbal communication between the parties and the
mediator; (d) free will of the parties (they cannot be coerced into a
decision); (e) a focus on obtaining consensus; (f) confidentiality of the
mediation proceedings; and (g) good faith. The Mediation Statute will be
interpreted hand-in-hand with the revised Brazilian Code of Civil
Procedure, which will go into effect in March 2016. The Civil Code
provides for mandatory mediation or conciliation hearings in the early
stages of major lawsuits. It is expected that the Mediation Statute and the
revised Civil Code will boost the use of mediation in Brazil.
Third, it appears that the rate of recovery of disputed amounts of money
in mediation (and arbitration) is higher than the recovery rate in judicial
proceedings. In 2006, the Multilateral Investment Fund of the InterAmerican Development Bank conducted a study of alternative dispute
resolution methods in Latin America.7 The study surveyed owners of small
and medium-sized enterprises about the effectiveness of recovering credit
through alternative dispute resolution procedures (i.e. arbitration, mediation
and conciliation) vis-ei-vis traditional judicial proceedings. The study
revealed that sixty-two percent of those surveyed admitted recovering less
than fifty-percent of the amounts in dispute through traditional judicial
proceedings. However, this percentage dropped to thirty-eight percent of
those surveyed when the proceedings used were either arbitration or
mediation. This statistic suggests that mediation (as well as arbitration)
may be more effective when it comes to recovery of damages in Latin
America than proceeding through the national courts. This may be another
reason why mediation (and arbitration) will be on the rise in Latin America.
7. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
THE COSTS OF DISPUTES IN COMPANIES AND THE USE OF ADR METHODS: LESSONS FROM

NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 41 (2006).

8. Id. at 41.
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CONCLUSION

Generally, it appears that Latin American corporate counsel are keen to
use other means of dispute resolution as an alternative to litigation in the
national courts. In particular, there is growing use and acceptance of
international commercial arbitration in Latin American jurisdictions. In
part, this development reflects stronger national arbitration laws, and courts
that are more friendly towards arbitration, as exhibited by their recent
decisions. Recent amendments to national arbitration laws have focused on
issues that previously made arbitration more cumbersome, and have
clarified the limited role of courts with regard to arbitration-related
litigation. For example, some amendments have developed a summary
procedure for a court to decide an application to enforce or vacate an
Other amendments have focused on provisional measures,
award.
clarifying both that arbitrators have the power to issue interim measures,
and then providing that such interim awards are judicially enforceable.
Thus, recent changes and amendments to national arbitration laws tend to
make clear that the judiciary should support the arbitral process.
However, there is still work to be done. This section discusses two
issues that need to be assessed - likely through the passage of time - to
determine the true attitude of Latin American jurisdictions towards
commercial arbitration. The first is the use of the amparo procedure and
the second is the manner in which national courts will enforce adverse
awards against State or State-owned entities. The two topics are discussed
in turn.
A.

The Continued Use of Amparo

Although there are positive decisions from various courts indicating that
the judiciary will be respectful of the arbitral process, some uncertainty
remains. For example, in the past, courts have granted amparo as an
extraordinary remedy that could be invoked to annul arbitral awards. The
question remains whether courts will continue to do so in the aftermath of
amendments to the national arbitration laws in various jurisdictions.
Colombia is a jurisdiction that illustrates this uncertainty. Colombia's
2012 arbitration law provides that annulment is the only means to set aside
an award. This might indicate that the procedures of amparo (called acci6n
de tutela in Colombia) are no longer available to a party seeking to annul
an award. However, no court has decided this issue. It may be possible
that a party will argue that, in addition to the grounds provided for in the
2012 law, it is still possible to use the constitutional remedy to annul an
award in order to safeguard a party's constitutional rights.
Indeed, prior to the enactment of the 2012 arbitration statute, the
Constitutional Court had repeatedly confirmed that amparo was available
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to annul arbitral awards. In Departamento del Valle del Cauca v. Arbitral
Tribunal (SU-174/07), the requesting party had already sought to annul the
arbitral award before the Council of State, but the court refused to grant
annulment. Subsequently, the requesting party filed an amparo against the
arbitral award and the Council of State's annulment decision alleging that
both of them violated its due process rights. 9 The court assessed whether
amparo was available to challenge arbitral awards. The court determined
that amparo could be used to annul arbitral awards to protect fundamental
constitutional rights of the requesting party.
Nonetheless, the court
restricted recourse to amparo to exceptional cases where arbitral awards
and annulment decisions are patently arbitrary or the product of voie defait
(via de hecho).' °
The court did try to impose some limitations on when a party could use
amparo to annul an award. First, courts may not review the merits of the
arbitral award in amparo proceedings. Second, the arbitral award must
directly damage or threaten fundamental rights of the requesting party for
amparo to be available. Third, the requesting party must have exhausted
all other legal actions available to challenge arbitral awards (i.e. annulment
proceedings) before invoking amparo. Fourth, amparo is only available
where the arbitral tribunal's decision is patently arbitrary or the product of
voie defait.1 I In addition, the court further explained that an arbitral award
is patently arbitrary or the product of voie defait only in the following four
cases: (i) the arbitral tribunal exercised its legal powers for a purpose that
does not correspond to the purposes for which these powers have been
conferred (e.g. the award is based on a legal or contractual provision that is
not applicable to the case); (ii) the arbitral tribunal has no competence to
decide the subject matter of the dispute; (iii) the arbitral tribunal issued its
award by completely deviating from or disregarding the applicable legal
procedure; and (iv) the arbitral tribunal issued a decision without
evidentiary support. 12
The court reaffirmed the availability of amparo against arbitral awards in
Municipality of Turbo v. Arbitral Tribunal (T-466/1 1). In that case, the
Municipality of Turbo invoked amparo against an arbitral award alleging
that the arbitral tribunal had violated its constitutional due process rights.
The requesting party claimed that the arbitral award was the product of voie
de fait because the tribunal failed to consider legal rules applicable to the
dispute (via de hecho por defecto sustantivo) and had assessed some

9. Constitutional Court, Decision No. SU-174/07, March 14, 2007,
10. Id. 5.4.
11. Id. 5.4.
12. Id. 5.4.1 - 5.4.4.

2.1 - 2.2.
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evidence in a patently arbitrary manner (via de hecho por defecto fictico).1
The court considered that the arbitral tribunal had breached the requesting
party's due process rights, having supported its decision on the isolated
assessment of documentary evidence that other evidence in the record
showed was not reliable. The court considered that such error in the
assessment of evidence was material to the outcome of the case, and thus
the requesting party's due process rights were affected. The court issued its
decision revoking the arbitral award.1 4 Considering the use of amparo to
annul arbitral awards in Colombia prior to the enactment of the 2012
arbitration laws, it remains to be seen whether courts will continue this
tradition notwithstanding the new legislation.
The Peruvian Constitutional Court has left the door open to invoke
amparo to protect constitutional rights. In the case Sociedad Minera de
ResponsabilidadLtda. Maria Julia, decided in 2011, the court confirmed

that amparo against an arbitral award was available, but in exceptional and
limited circumstances. The requesting party filed an amparo against an
arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had violated its due
process rights and other procedural rights. In particular, the requesting
party argued that the arbitral tribunal erroneously interpreted contract
provisions, having relied on legal provisions that did not apply to the
dispute, and1 5 failing to adequately examine all facts and evidence in the
proceeding.

The Peruvian Constitutional Court determined that the general rule is
that amparo proceedings are not available to challenge arbitral awards.
The court reasoned that annulment proceedings against arbitral awards
under Peruvian legislation were "a true procedural option with a purpose
that, technically speaking, may substitute amparo in cases where the
defense of constitutional rights is sought."' 6 Nonetheless, the court
identified three exceptional circumstances where amparo may still be
invoked against arbitral awards, namely in cases where: (i) the basis to
request amparo is the direct contradiction by the arbitral tribunal of binding
legal precedents of the Constitutional Court; (ii) the arbitral tribunal does
not apply a legal provision, which the Constitutional Court has found to be
constitutional, on the basis that its application would produce
unconstitutional results (control difuso); and (iii) a third party to the
arbitration agreement initiates amparo proceedings against an arbitral
award that directly impinges on its constitutional rights. To be able to
13. Constitutional Court, Decision No. T-466/1 1, June 9, 2011.
14. Id.
15.

Constitutional Court, Sociedad Minera de ResponsabilidadLtda. Maria Julia,

Case No. 00142-201 1-OA/TC, September 21, 2011,
16.

Id.

17.

28.
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invoke amparo in the first two situations, the requesting party must first
raise the objection before the arbitral tribunal. 7 Ultimately, the court
reached the conclusion that the requesting party's arguments for requesting
amparo against the award were not valid grounds to invoke this action, and
8
thus dismissed the complaint.'
These cases from Colombia and Peru show that, in the past, recourse has
been made to amparo as a basis to annul an award, even if such a
procedure is not recognized by national arbitration laws (which tend to
limit the grounds upon which the losing party can seek to annul an award,
usually to those grounds specified in the UNCITRAL Model Law). It
remains to be seen whether courts will resort to this procedure to annul
arbitral awards, notwithstanding recent amendments to national arbitration
laws that expressly specify - and limit - the grounds upon which an award
can be annulled. It may be difficult to put an end to the recourse to the
amparo procedure to annul an award given the relatively long tradition of
making such applications in a number of Latin American jurisdictions.
B. ArbitratingAgainst State or State-Owned Latin American Entities
Latin American jurisdictions have shown themselves to be more hostile
towards arbitration when one of the parties in the arbitration is a State or
State-owned entities.
Here, it is important to distinguish between
investment treaty arbitration - where one of the parties (in the vast majority
of cases, the respondent) is a State or State-owned entity - and
international commercial arbitration, where the majority of arbitrations will
concern private parties, and only occasionally involve public entities.
There has been a considerable backlash against investment treaty
arbitration in some Latin American jurisdictions. Some countries, such as
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, have denounced the Convention on the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID
Convention").
In addition, some countries, such as Ecuador, have
terminated some of their bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") with other
trading parties on the basis that the BITs have not brought in sufficient
foreign direct investment when measured against potential liabilities for
which the government may be accountable under those BITs. Other
countries, such as Argentina, have refused to pay awards owed to claimants
that have prevailed in arbitrations initiated under these BITs. What these
States - Argentina, Bolivia Ecuador and Venezuela - have in common is a
sense that the regime of investment arbitration is unfairly stacked against
developing States. Some of these States have taken this view because they

17.

Id.

21.

18. Id. 29.
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have been the respondents in a relatively large number of arbitrations
(Argentina, for example). And others have taken this position because, in
their view, relatively large damages awards have been rendered against
them. For example, ExxonMobil has been awarded US$1.6 billion by an
arbitral tribunal in Venezuela Holdings B. V. and others v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, and Ecuador has very
recently partially annulled the award in Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/1 1, reducing the damages award from US$1.7 billion to US
1.1 billion, which is still a considerable amount given Ecuador's GDP.
For purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that there is a
distinction between the attitudes of these jurisdictions towards investment
arbitration versus their attitudes regarding international commercial
arbitration. While States may not like being hauled before arbitral tribunals
constituted under BITs and MIAs to be held accountable for alleged
violations of these international law instruments, nonetheless, as has been
discussed throughout this article, Latin American jurisdictions remain keen
to develop arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, especially for
private disputes. Thus, we see the changes in the laws and the attitudes of
the courts towards international arbitration, discussed in the preceding
sections.
That being said, the test for the true receptivity by Latin American
jurisdictions to the systematic use of commercial arbitration will be
assessing how the judiciaries respond when the award debtor is a State or
There remains some concern on the part of
State-owned entity.
commercial parties that the odds will be stacked against them if they
choose to seat an arbitration against a State-owned entity in a Latin
American jurisdiction, and, in particular, in the jurisdiction of the adverse
entity. In some cases, this may be inevitable if the private party wishes to
do business with the State-owned entity. The laws of some countries
require that contracts between a commercial party and a State-owned entity
call for dispute resolution in the host country (usually, before the courts of
that country, but occasionally through arbitration seated in that country).
We have seen repeatedly that the national courts have bent the rules when it
comes to enforcing adverse awards against State-owned entities. Consider,
for example, the case of Corporaci6nMexicana de Mantenimiento Integral
v. Pemex-Exploraci6n y Producci6n, where the District Court for the
Southern District of New York concluded that the Mexican courts violated
basic notions of justice when they retroactively applied Mexican statutory
law that was not in effect at the time a private party, COMMISA, entered
into a contract with the Mexican state agency that controlled Mexican
hydrocarbons, to annul an arbitral award rendered by an arbitral tribunal
seated in Mexico. So, one question that arises is, even if investment
arbitration and commercial arbitration are viewed differently by Latin
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American governments, will an international party be unfairly
disadvantaged if it arbitrates against a State-owned entity in Latin
America? Fair resolution of such disputes will be the true test of the
attitude of Latin American governments towards the use of arbitration to
resolve commercial disputes. It should not be the case that attitudes differ
depending on whether arbitration concerns private parties only or a State/
or State-owned entity as well.

